Ernest K. Gleed and Louise L. Baugh v. Penny L. Mackey : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1994
Ernest K. Gleed and Louise L. Baugh v. Penny L.
Mackey : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Nathan Hult; Attorney for Defendant.
Philip C. Patterson; Patterson Barking & Sensenig; Attorney for Plaintiff.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Gleed and Baugh v. Baugh, No. 940257 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1994).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/5937
UTAH C01 
-AiS 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
K FU 
£> 
.' 0 
LwCKET NO. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
qw?7-
ERNEST K. GLEED, 
Plaintiff, Appellee, 
and Cross-Appellant, 
and 
LOUISE L. BAUGH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
PENNY L. MACKEY, 
Defendant, Appellant, 
and Cross-Appellee. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Appellant's Reply Brief to 
Brief of Appellee and Cross-
Appellant 
Appellate Court No. 940257-CA 
Priority No. 15 
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT OF SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE JON M. MEMMOTT, JUDGE, PRESIDING 
NATHAN HULT [4704] 
110 North 100 East 
P.O. Box 543 
Logan, Utah 84323-0543 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant/ 
Cross-Appellee 
PHILIP C. PATTERSON [2540] 
PATTERSON, BARKING, & SENSENIG 
427 27th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees/ 
Cro s s-Appe11ant 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
HOV 0 1 tVh 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Marilyn M. Branch 
Clerk of the Court 
Marilyn M. Branch 
Clerk of the Court 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ERNEST K. GLEED, 
Plaintiff, Appellee, 
and Cross-Appellant, 
and 
LOUISE L. BAUGH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
PENNY L. MACKEY, 
Defendant , Appellant, 
and Cross-Appellee. 
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT OF SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE JON M. MEMMOTT, JUDGE, PRESIDING 
NATHAN HULT [4704] 
110 North 100 East 
P.O. Box 543 
Logan, Utah 84323-0543 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant/ 
Cross-Appellee 
PHILIP C. PATTERSON [2540] 
PATTERSON, BARKING, & SENSENIG 
427 27th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees/ 
Cross-Appellant 
• 
* Appellant's Reply Brief to 
* Brief of Appellee and Cross-
* Appellant 
* Appellate Court No. 940257-CA 
* 
* Priority No. 15 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Table of Authorities iii 
Statutes Cited iii 
Introduction 1 
Relevant Statutory Provisions 1 
Reply to Gleed's Arguments 2 
I. BOTH FACTUAL FINDINGS AND LEGAL 
CONCLUSIONS OF THE TRIAL COURT ARE AT ISSUE 
ON APPEAL, CONTRARY TO GLEED'S CLAIM THAT 
ONLY FACTUAL FINDINGS ARE AT ISSUE 2 
II. THE ISSUE OF WHETHER A LIFE ESTATE MIGHT 
BE RETAINED WHILE CONVEYING A VESTED 
REMAINDER INTEREST CAN BE RAISED ON APPEAL, 
CONTRARY TO GLEED'S ASSERTION 7 
III. GLEED ERRONEOUSLY CLAIMS "THE FACT 
PATTERN AND LEGAL ISSUES SURROUNDING THE 
MARCH 1992 QUIT-CLAIM DEED DID NOT COMPEL THE 
TRIAL COURT TO EXTEND ITS CONSIDERATION TO 
THE FEBRUARY 14, 1990 DEED IN ORDER TO FULLY 
ADJUDICATE THE RELIEF SOUGHT BY GLEED IN THIS 
ACTION" (BRIEF OF APPELLEE AT 15) 
Conclusion 10 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Davidson Lumber Sales, Inc, v. 
Bonneville Inv., Inc,, 794 P.2d 11 (Utah 1990) • . . . 2 
Doelle v, Bradley, 
784 P.2d 1176 (Utah 1989) 4 
Hartman v. Potter, 
596 P.2d 653 (Utah 1979) 3#4 
Hatch v, Bastian, 
567 P.2d 1100 (Utah 1977) 6 
State v, Larsen, 
865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993) 3 
State v. Olsen, 
860 P.2d 332 (Utah 1993) 7 
State v. Whittle, 
780 P.2d 819 (Utah 1989) 7 
Terry v. Price Mun. Corp., 
784 P.2d 146 (Utah 1989) 2 
United Park City Mines Co. v. 
Greater Park City Co., 870 P.2d 880 (Utah 1993). . . . 2 
STATUTES CITED 
Utah Code Unannotated, §57-1-3 3 
Utah Code Unannotated, § 57-1-13 lf3 
iii 
INTRODUCTION 
Following is the reply of Appellant Penny Mackey ("Mackey") 
to the arguments made by Appellee Ernest Gleed ("Gleed") in his 
brief ("Brief of Appellee") to this Court. Mackey submitted her 
brief ("Brief of Appellant") to this Court on July 14, 1994. The 
issues on appeal in this case relate to: 1) A 1990 warranty deed 
by which Louise Baugh ("Baugh") conveyed to herself and her son 
Gleed a joint tenancy interest in two adjacent homes she owned in 
Clearfield, Utah; and 2) A 1992 quitclaim deed by which Baugh 
conveyed her remaining interest in the two homes (the "Rental 
Home" and the "Baugh Home") to her granddaughter Mackey, thereby 
severing the joint tenancy with Gleed and making Gleed and Mackey 
tenants in common. Baugh is now deceased. 
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
There are two relevant statutory provions on this appeal. UTAH 
CODE UNANN. § 57-1-13 states: 
Conveyances of land may also be substantially in the 
following form: 
QUITCLAIM DEED 
(here insert name), grantor, of (insert 
place of residence), hereby quitclaims to (insert 
name), grantee, of (here insert place of 
residence), for the sum of dollars, the following 
described tract of land in County, Utah, to 
wit: (here describe the premises). 
Witness the hand of said grantor this day of _ 
, 19_ . 
Such deed when executed as required by law shall 
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have the effect of a conveyance of all right, title, 
interest and estate of the grantor in and to the 
premises therein described and all rights, priveleges 
and appurtances thereunto belonging, at the date of 
such conveyance. 
The second relevant provision is UTAH CODE UNANN. § 57-1-3 (1993), 
which was quoted in the previously submitted Brief of Appellant. 
REPLY TO GLEED'S ARGUMENTS 
I. BOTH FACTUAL FINDINGS AND LEGAL CONCLUSIONS OF THE 
TRIAL COURT ARE AT ISSUE ON APPEAL, CONTRARY TO GLEED'S 
CLAIM THAT ONLY FACTUAL FINDINGS ARE AT ISSUE 
Gleed incorrectly asserts (Brief of Appellee at 19) that 
review of the validity of the March 23, 1992 quitclaim deed is 
purely a review of the trial court's findings of fact, when there 
are actually both factual and legal conclusions that should be 
reviewed. Findings of fact should be reviewed under the "clearly 
erroneous" standard, as Gleed points out. However, conclusions 
of law are reviewed for correctness. See, e.g., Davidson Lumber 
Sales, Inc. v. Bonneville Inv.f Inc., 794 P.2d 11 (Utah 1990). 
A. Conclusions of Law 
An appellate court pays no deference to a trial court's 
conclusions of law. See, e.g., United Park City Mines Co. v. 
Greater Park City Co., 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah 1993). "In the 
absence of ambiguity, construction of a deed is a question of 
law, and this court is not bound by the trial court's 
determination." Terry v. Price Mun. Corp., 784 P.2d 146, 149 
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(Utah 1989). Additionally, when a trial court interprets a 
statute, an appellate court is to pay no deference to the trial 
court's interpretation. See, e.g., State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 
1355, 1357 (Utah 1993). 
It is difficult to imagine a deed being less ambiguous than 
the March 23, 1992 quitclaim deed wherein Baugh conveyed her 
interest in the two properties to Mackey (see Brief of Appellant 
at Addendum 1). It unambiguously states that Louise Baugh hereby 
quitclaims her interest in the two properties and conveys them to 
Penny Mackey. Therefore, the construction of this deed should be 
reviewed as a matter of law, and the correctness of the trial 
court's ruling that the deed was invalid should be determined. 
Moreover, the Utah Legislature has prescribed a form for 
quitclaim deeds and has stated, n[s]uch deed when executed as 
required by law shall have the effect of a conveyance of all 
right, title, interest, and estate of the grantor in and to the 
premises therein described and all rights, privileges and 
appurtances thereunto belonging at the date of such conveyance." 
UTAH CODE UNANN. § 57-1-13. The quitclaim deed from Baugh to 
Mackey complies with this statutorily prescribed form and 
therefore its validity and effect should be construed as a matter 
of law. Additionally, as pointed out in the Brief of Appellant 
at 9, a fee simple title is presumed to pass by a conveyance of 
real estate unless "it appears from the conveyance that a lesser 
estate was intended." UTAH CODE UNANN. § 57-1-3 (emphasis added). 
That is, "the term 'intention,' as applied to the construction of 
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a deed, is to be distinguished from its usual connotation • . . . 
[W]hen so applied it is a term of art and signifies the meaning 
of the writing." Hartman v. Potter, 596 P.2d 653, 656 (Utah 
1979) . 
While the trial court did not explicitly interpret these 
sections of the Utah Code, they certainly apply to this matter, 
and this Court is in as good a position to rule on the force of 
statutory provisions relative to the March 23, 1992 quitclaim 
deed as the trial court would have been. Moreover, by its 
silence the trial court interpreted these statutory provisions as 
not controlling the validity of the March 23, 1992 quitclaim 
deed. The policy question this silence presents to this Court is 
this: to what degree should trial courts be permitted to seek 
evidence of a grantor's intent outside of a deed when it has not 
explicitly determined that statutory commands protecting the 
sanctity of unambiguous deeds are not controlling. This question 
is purely a question of law and is appropriately before this 
Court. Therefore, review of the validity of the March 23, 1992 
quitclaim deed is primarily a question of law and this Court need 
not show any deference to the trial court's conclusions. 
B. Findings of Fact 
Gleed correctly points out that a party challenging findings 
of fact must first marshall all of the evidence in support of the 
trial court's finding, and then point out why the trial court's 
finding is clearly erroneous. See, e.g., Doelle v. Bradley, 784 
P.2d 1176 (Utah 1989). Mackey has met that burden, contrary to 
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d e e d ' s claim. 
1. Marshalling the Evidence 
The Statement of Facts (Brief of Appellant at 4) provides a 
concise but thorough summary of the case. It—unlike the Brief 
of Appellee—focuses on the proceedings surrounding the actual 
execution of the March 23, 1992 quitclaim deed, the form of the 
deed, and Baugh's intent when she actually executed the quitclaim 
deed. The reason for that focus is because a crucial question is 
whether Baugh had a present intent to convey her property when 
she executed the quitclaim deed. Information showing that Baugh 
later changed her mind (see Brief of Appellee at 22) does not 
relate to whether Baugh presently conveyed her property interests 
on March 23, 1992. Additionally, Mackey provided this Court with 
verbatim copies of the trial court's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, as well as its August 25, 1993 bench ruling 
(Brief of Appellant Addenda 3 and 4). These certainly summarize 
all of the evidence presented at trial, and present it in a light 
favorable to the trial court because they are in the trial 
court's own words. 
2. Clearly Erroneous Findings 
Based on the marshalled evidence, there is a clearly 
erroneous finding due to inconsistency. On the one hand the 
trial court ruled that Baugh intended to retain her entire 
ownership interest in the Baugh Home and to leave undisturbed her 
joint tenancy interest with Gleed in the Rental Home, giving 
Mackey no valid property interest at all (Findings of Fact 21(a) 
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and 21(b)—see Brief of Appellant Addendum 4). But on the other 
hand Baugh sought to place negotiating pressure on Gleed in hopes 
of causing reciprocal conveyances between Mackey and Gleed of 
their interests in the two properties (Finding of Fact 21(c)). 
In essence the trial court ruled that Baugh sought to give Mackey 
negotiating leverage over Gleed by giving Mackey nothing with 
which to bargain. This is a glaring inconsistency and is a clear 
error, particularly as it relates to Conclusion of Law 14. 
Finally, where reformation of a deed is at issue, an 
appellate court can review both findings of fact and conclusions 
of law since the court sits in equity. Hatch v. Bastian, 567 
P.2d 1100, 1101-02 (Utah 1977). And while appellate courts give 
great deference to a trial court's findings of fact even when 
sitting in equity, where the interests of justice require, review 
of the evidence and independent findings of fact are appropriate. 
Id. Here, Gleed argues he should be the sole owner of two 
houses, and Baugh's favorite granddaughter, Mackey, should have 
nothing. The trial court's ruling gives force to this 
inequitable argument, so a close review of the trial court's 
findings of fact is appropriate to ensure justice is served. 
C. Conclusion 
This appeal presents substantial legal questions because the 
1992 quitclaim deed was unambiguous and therefore can be 
interpreted as a matter of law. Additionally, statutory law is 
implicated in this case and has significant ramifications as to 
what degree a trial court should be permitted to seek evidence of 
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intent outside of an unambiguous and duly executed quitclaim 
deed. Therefore, this Court can review whether the trial court 
correctly determined these issues. Additionally, Mackey 
correctly marshalled the evidence relating to the trial court's 
findings of fact, and pointed out how several of those findings 
are so inconsistent as to be clearly erroneous. Therefore, this 
Court can also review those issues. 
II. THE ISSUE OF WHETHER A LIFE ESTATE MIGHT BE 
RETAINED WHILE CONVEYING A VESTED REMAINDER INTEREST 
CAN BE RAISED ON APPEAL, CONTRARY TO GLEEDrS ASSERTION 
Gleed asserts (Brief of Appellee at 16) that the issue of 
whether Baugh retained an implied life estate while giving Mackey 
a present and vested remainder interest when she executed the 
March 23, 1992 quitclaim deed cannot be raised as an alternative 
(see Brief of Appellant at 20) theory for upholding the validity 
of the quitclaim deed. However, an issue can be raised on appeal 
if "plain error" was apparent in the trial court proceeding, and 
if the plain error should have been obvious to the trial court 
and substantially affects the rights of a party. See State v. 
Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 333 (Utah 1993); State v. Whittle, 780 P.2d 
819, 821 (Utah 1989) . 
Mackey's counsel raised the issue of the need to uphold the 
validity of the quitclaim deed in both her opening and closing 
remarks (Trial Transcripts Volume I at 27 and Volume III at 271). 
The need for a trial court to attempt to uphold the validity of a 
deed is particularly apparent given the statutory commands 
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discussed above. Additionally, there was substantial testimony 
indicating that: 1) Baugh wanted to remain in her house during 
her lifetime (e.g., Trial Transcripts Volume I at 174-75); and 2) 
Baugh wanted Mackey to "have" her house when she died (e.g., 
Trial Transcripts Volume III at 220, 238, 240). Furthermore, the 
trial court found that Baugh sought to place negotiating pressure 
on Gleed by executing the March 23, 1992 quitclaim deed, yet when 
executing the deed Baugh did not intend to convey any present 
ownership interest to Mackey (Findings of Fact 21(a), 21(b), and 
21(c)—see Brief of Appellant at Addendum 4). 
It is plain error for the trial court to in essence rule 
that Baugh sought to give Mackey negotiating leverage with Gleed 
by giving Mackey nothing with which to bargain, particularly in 
the face of substantial testimony indicating that Baugh wanted 
Mackey to "have" the Baugh Home on her death, but to continue 
living in the Baugh Home during her lifetime. Certainly a trial 
court should consider the possibility that a life estate was 
intended given these facts, particularly since the trial court 
was sitting in equity and Mackey's counsel had stressed the need 
to uphold the validity of the deed, which is in keeping with 
legislative policy in Utah. To not consider this possibility 
was plain error and should have been obvious to the trial court. 
Additionally, this failure obviously affects Mackey's substantive 
rights since its effect is to prevent her from assuming an 
ownership interest in the two homes. 
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III. GLEED ERRONEOUSLY CLAIMS "THE FACT PATTERN AND 
LEGAL ISSUES SURROUNDING THE MARCH 1992 QUIT-CLAIM DEED 
DID NOT COMPEL THE TRIAL COURT TO EXTEND ITS 
CONSIDERATION TO THE FEBRUARY 14, 1990 DEED IN ORDER TO 
FULLY ADJUDICATE THE RELIEF SOUGHT BY GLEED IN THIS 
ACTION" (BRIEF OF APPELLEE AT 15) 
The answer to this issue may depend on whether the trial 
court had any basis to sit as a court in equity to reform the 
1992 deed or whether, as a matter of law it was obligated to 
uphold the validity of that deed. The trial court concluded that 
neither the 1990 deed nor the 1992 deed were obtained as a result 
of fraud or undue influence, and therefore it should have upheld 
both deeds as valid as a matter of law. 
However, in looking behind the 1992 deed and finding that 
Louise Baugh intended to retain ownership interest and not 
transfer her ownership interest until the time of her death 
(Finding 21(a)) the court felt that the testimony compelled that 
the same intent "to have a life interest in the home" (Addendum 
5, Appellant's Brief, p. 14, 1.17) applied to the 1990 deed as 
well. (Addendum 5, p. 14, 1. 13). Going on, the trial court 
stated, referring to the Baugh home, "And I think clearly her 
intent throughout this was that she maintain a life interest and 
it be her home during her life. (Emphasis added). She conveyed 
it originally to Ernie. The intent was is [sic] that she have it 
for a lifetime and upon death Ernie would have it. And when she 
changed Ernie's name her intent at that time was to and I think 
when she did it she intended to convey it - that she maintain a 
life interest and she convey it to Penny after her death. And 
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both of these instances, based on the law, I think that that is 
not a valid conveyance. (Addendum 5, p.16, 1. 17 - p. 17, 1. 2). 
Both the 1990 and 1992 deeds were admitted into evidence and 
the judge found that Louise Baugh's intent with regard to both 
deeds was the same as far as her home was concerned, that she 
"maintain a life estate." If the 1992 deed must fail because of 
that intent, the same must logically and in fairness be applied 
to the 1990 deed as to that particular home. 
CONCLUSION 
Determining the validity of the 1992 quitclaim deed is 
primarily a question of law and therefore this Court owes no 
deference to the trial court's determination. Additionally, the 
factual findings of the trial court regarding the 1992 quitclaim 
deed can be reviewed by this Court because several of the 
findings are clearly erroneous due to inconsistency. Moreover, 
this Court can also determine whether an implied life estate was 
reserved for Baugh in the 1992 quitclaim deed while granting 
Mackey a vested remainder interest because the trial court 
committed plain error in not considering this possibility. 
Finally, Gleed incorrectly asserts that the trial court could not 
determine the validity of the 1990 warranty deed, deed's 
interests in the Baugh Home and Rental Home are dependant on 
whether his interests derive from the 1990 warranty deed, or 
merely as one surviving heir of Louise Baugh, and therefore the 
trial court was correct to consider the validity of the 1990 
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warranty deed in adjudicating the relief sought by Gleed, 
DATED this day of October, 1994. 
NatKan Hult 
Attorney for Appellant 
110 North 100 East 
P.O. Box 543 
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